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KOREAN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS: READY TO
TAKE ON ONE OF THE WORLD’S LARGEST PRIVATE
REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS?
Joon H. Kim†
Abstract: The South Korean government designated three new Free Economic
Zones in an effort to become the financial and logistical hub of Northeast Asia. One of
these zones, the Incheon Free Economic Zone (“IFEZ”), will encompass 209 square
kilometers of completely new development on reclaimed land and is said to be the
biggest real estate development project currently in the world. China started using
economic zones much earlier in history and although China experienced economic
benefits, it also experienced severe environmental degradation in its highly successful
special economic zones. Similarly tremendous economic growth will result from the
influx of foreign direct investment into IFEZ, which is likely to result in some
environmental harm. This Comment argues that with such high levels of concentrated
development, the existing South Korean environmental regulatory system will not to be
able to protect the natural environment within the IFEZ. Although many Korean
environmental regulations were modeled after proven Western regulations, the Korean
regulatory regime requires improvements. The current Korean environmental regulatory
system is inadequate because of poor enforcement, narrow definitions of judicial standing
and justiciability for purposes of judicial review, inadequate judicial remedies, and
inadequate environmental laws. Comparison with U.S. environmental regulations
provides evidence that South Korean environmental regulations lack mechanisms to
adequately protect South Korea’s natural resources. This comparison also shows some
areas of the Korean environmental regulatory system that require change. Without
government effort to enhance the effectiveness of existing regulations, South Korea will
likely face the grave environmental degradation that China experienced. South Korea
should make necessary changes to create a better regulatory system.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Korea1 is building a new master-planned city on reclaimed lands with
all new infrastructure, a six-mile bridge, and one of Korea’s tallest buildings
at 65 stories.2 A new convention center, system of canals, world-class golf
course, a mix of office, residential, and office buildings, and large civic and

†

Juris Doctor and Master of Urban Planning expected in 2007, University of Washington, School
of Law & College of Architecture and Urban Planning. The author would like to thank Professor Joel
Ngugi for his valuable guidance and suggestions on this Comment. The author would also like to thank the
editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their hard work and commitment. Any errors or
omissions are author’s own.
1
For purposes of this comment, “Korea” refers to the Republic of Korea, also known as South
Korea.
2
Keun-Min Bae, Incheon Opens Doors to N-E Asia & Beyond, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at 11,
13.
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smaller pocket parks are also part of Korea’s plans for this new city.3 This is
the Songdo City, a self-sufficient metropolis that will be big enough to
support 487,000 people, advancing Korea’s plan to increase its international
competitiveness.4 Songdo City is one of three cities planned as part of the
Incheon Free Economic Zone (“IFEZ”).5
The Korean government
designated the IFEZ in an effort to become a regional economic hub in
Northeast Asia.6
The IFEZ was established in August 2003 by the Act on Designation
and Management of the Free Economic Zones (“The FEZ Act”).7 As the
country’s first FEZ, the IFEZ is located close to the Incheon International
Airport.8 Two months after the passage of the FEZ Act, the Korean
government added two more FEZs: Pusan/Jinhae and Gwangyang.9
Developing Free Economic Zones is one of Korea’s “key strategies to
prepare for the era of Northeast Asia,” a region that is emerging as a global
economic powerhouse, with a population four times that of Europe, and a
twenty percent share of the world’s gross domestic production.10 As part of
a strategy to counter increased competition from other countries in the global
economy, Korea launched a program of developing FEZs.11
With such a large scale development at Songdo,12 the Korean
government is also likely to face tremendous environmental challenges.
Korea may suffer the same severe environmental degradation that China
experienced, which resulted from explosive population growth and
economic development in the Chinese special economic zones (“SEZs”)
3
See Andrew Salmon, Breaking Ground on a Korean Bid to Rival Shanghai, INT’L HERALD
TRIBUNE, Nov. 12, 2004.
4
See Bae, supra note 2, at 11, 13.
5
Id. at 11.
6
Free Economic Zones to Attract $5 Billion in 2005, KOREA TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005.
7
Act on Designation and Management of Free Economic Zones, Statutes of the Republic of Korea,
vol. 13, ch. 1, art. 1, Act No. 6835 (last amended through Act. No. 7349) [hereinafter The FEZ Act].
8
See Florence Lowe-Lee, Economic Trends, KOREA INSIGHT, Oct. 2005, at 2, available at
http://www.keia.com/2-Publications/2-1-Insight/Insight-October05.pdf.
9
Country Commerce South Korea 2004/2005 Main Report, REGULATORY/MARKET WATCH, July
30, 2004; Lee Hwan-kyun, Incheon Free Economic Zone to Be Gateway to N-E Asia, KOREA TIMES, Feb.
22, 2004, available at http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/special/200402/ kt2004022217065811460.htm.
10
Jeo-yeon Seo, FEZs to Create International Cities, KOREA TIMES, Nov. 19, 2004.
11
Id.
12
Salmon, supra note 3. This Comment will examine potential development impacts to the
environment only for Songdo City because Songdo City is the first of the three new cities in IFEZ to have
begun construction and IFEZ is the first of the three designated FEZs. As of December, 2005, Songdo City
is under construction with “Phase I” that includes a Convention Center complex and a mixed-use
retail/residential compound. The other cities planned as part of the IFEZ are Yeongjong and Cheongna.
Together, the three new cities will become home to almost one million people. Development of Songdo
City itself is currently considered the world’s biggest private real estate development project.
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during the 1980s.13 China’s SEZs received the greatest proportion of foreign
direct investment (“FDI”) in China14 which led to exponential economic
growth. Along with the economic growth, however, China’s SEZs
experienced profound environmental consequences. These SEZs were
designated in China’s already environmentally distressed regions, which
intensified the problem.15 For example, the rapid growth of industries and
population in Shenzhen SEZ led to a significant decline in environmental
quality such as decreases in air quality, water quality, and waste concerns.16
IFEZ’s ambitious real estate development plans will similarly face
tremendous environmental problems due to the IFEZ’s location and size.
This Comment argues that the existing Korean environmental
regulatory system is inadequate to protect the fragile ecosystems of the IFEZ
from this potentially explosive growth. The Korean environmental
regulations were modeled after the Western regulations, and while they are
generally considered effective, these regulations, like their Western
counterparts, are not perfect.17 The fragility of the natural environment in
Korea’s FEZs, combined with Korea’s ongoing problems with its
environmental regulatory regime will hinder fulfillment of Korea’s
environmental protection goals and result in great environmental
degradation in its FEZs. China’s experience is provided as support that
Korea will face environmental challenges in its FEZs.
This Comment analyzes the effectiveness of existing Korean
environmental regulations as applied to the development of Songdo City.
Part II examines China’s experience with SEZs and the resulting
environmental degradation, and considers the implications for the future of
13
See Joseph Profaizer, Economic Development and Environmental Law in China’s Special
Economic Zones, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 319 (1993). See generally Benjamin Richardson, Is East Asia
Industrializing Too Quickly? Environmental Regulation in Its Special Economic Zones, 22 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 150 (2004).
14
See Richardson, supra note 13, at 156. Shenzhen SEZ, which is one of China’s first designated
SEZs, received approximately $20 billion of FDI between 1980 and 2000.
15
See Profaizer, supra note 13, at 321.
16
See generally Jianfa Shen, Urbanization in Southern China: The Rise of Shenzhen City, in
PROBLEMS OF MEGACITIES: SOCIAL INEQUALITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND URBAN GOVERNANCE
(A.G. Aguilar and I. Escamilla eds., 1999), available at http://ihome.cuhk.edu.hk/~b890706/download/
P11y1999.pdf (noting that rapid urbanization in Shenzhen have contributed to environmental pollution).
For additional information regarding environmental degradation in China’s SEZs, see discussion infra Part
II.
17
See Oliver A. Houck, Recent Developments in the Clean Water Act, 1998-1999, A.L.I.-A.B.A.
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. COURSE OF STUDY, Feb. 10, 1999, at 535 (noting the Clean Water Act as a
prime example of a U.S. environmental regulation which has been praised for its effectiveness, but has also
had some criticism); William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537 (2004) (noting that although the U.S. CWA has been very successful, there
are some flaws in the regulations).
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the environment in Korea’s FEZs. Part III asserts that IFEZ is likely to
encounter a great deal of environmental challenges. Part IV considers
certain problems of the Korean regulatory environment, specifically the
Environmental Impact Assessment Act,18 and provides evidence that Korean
environmental regulations, Korea’s Water Quality Conservation Act19 and
Coastal Zone Management Act,20
which were modeled after U.S.
environmental regulations, have many flaws. Part V examines problems of
Korea’s environmental regulatory system arising from Korea’s effort to
increase economic competitiveness.
Part VI makes specific
recommendations to Korea’s environmental regulatory regime that should
aid in withstanding environmental pressures of development in the IFEZ.
This Comment concludes that Korea should adopt new approaches in
dealing with environmental impacts in its FEZs to remedy potential
environmental problems that will arise as a consequence of growth in the
FEZs.
II.

CHINA’S EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT RAPID GROWTH IN SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONES WITHOUT ADEQUATE ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS RESULTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

China’s experience with environmental harm resulting from rapid
growth in its SEZs is a warning that Korea may face similar environmental
challenges in its FEZs. China’s Shenzhen SEZ experienced unpredicted
rates of economic and population growth. Although the Chinese government
anticipated environmental challenges in its SEZs and responded by creating
a regulatory regime aimed at mitigating adverse environmental impact, this
regime proved inadequate.21 Environmental problems were exacerbated
when growth occurred at a much faster rate than the Chinese government
expected. China was not prepared to overcome environmental challenges
and suffered grave environmental harm as a consequence.

18

Environmental Impact Assessment Act, June 11, 1993, Law No. 4567.
Water Quality Conservation Act, Amended by Act No. 7249, Oct. 22, 2004 (also available in
Statutes of the Republic of Korea, Volume 18, Part 37, Environment (Korean Legislation Research
Institute)).
20
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1999, available at http://www.globaloceans.org/
koreanczma.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
21
See Profaizer, supra note 13, at 321.
19
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China Faced Environmental Challenges in Its Special Economic
Zones Resulting from Unpredicted Rates of Growth

During the mid-20th century, the Chinese government emphasized
political and economic concerns.22 As a result, the country experienced
widespread environmental degradation.23 Although China’s environmental
awareness grew during the 1970s, economic concerns still dominated policy
decisions. Environmental health was not a priority.24 Many heavily
polluting foreign industries moved into the SEZs despite the Chinese
government’s statements that they would only welcome industries using
advanced techniques for pollution control.25
China has the most extensive array of SEZs in the world and some of
these SEZs suffered great environmental harm.26 China’s four original
SEZs—Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, and Xiamen—experienced rapid
economic development with severe consequences for the environment.
Shenzhen SEZ’s population exploded from approximately 94,100 in 1980 to
almost one million by 1992, exceeding projections.27 This explosive growth
led to numerous landfills, tremendous increases in human and animal waste,
deforestation, and soil erosion.28 There were problems with inefficient
energy production and high levels of consumption, which led to air quality
problems.29 Increased output of untreated wastewater and industrial waste
led to a decline in water quality.30 Beyond these basic concerns over air,
water, and noise pollution, China’s SEZs also contributed to concerns
regarding toxic contamination, increases in blood-lead concentrations, the
use of genetically-modified crops, and the loss of wetlands.31 These

22
Cai Shouqiu & Mark Voigts, The Development of China’s Environmental Diplomacy, 3 PAC. RIM
L. & POL’Y J. S-17, S-18 (1993) (noting that China’s past environmental neglect was a result of policies
that were more concerned with improving living standards and national wealth than environmental
protection).
23
Id. at S-20 (noting that China allowed the development of many factories that took no action
toward pollution control).
24
Id. at S-23.
25
Profaizer, supra note 13, at 324.
26
Richardson, supra note 13, at 163; see also Shen, supra note 16, at 7.
27
Profaizer, supra note 13, at 326.
28
Id.; Shen, supra note 16, at 10. China lost a total of approximately 0.62 million hectares of arable
land in 1995 alone.
29
Profaizer, supra note 13, at 327.
30
Id. at 325; Shen, supra note 16, at 12. The amount of wastewater increased from 136.85 million
tons in 1990 to over 270 million tons in 1995, partly due from increase in population but as much from
increase in wastewater discharge per person.
31
Richard J.Ferris & Hongjun Zhang, Reaching Out to the Rule of Law: China's Continuing Efforts
to Develop an Effective Environmental Law Regime, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 569, 573-74 (2003).
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environmental concerns and problems demonstrate the incredible strain
unpredictable growth had on China’s environment.
Chinese SEZs caused not only local, regional and national
environmental degradation, but also caused international environmental
concerns.32 For example, “yellow dust” from China spread across borders,
reaching Korea, Taiwan, and other East Asian countries.33 This yellow dust
triggered acid rain in Korea and Japan.34 Chinese SEZs may also be
contributing to climate change, ozone depletion, and acidification of
ecosystems.35 China took responsibility for these problems, however, by
increasing its efforts to reduce the tension between environmental stress and
economic growth.
B.

China’s Efforts to Improve Its Environmental Regulations Were
Unsuccessful

Contrary to the theory that developing countries will often forego
environmental protection for economic development, Chinese government
leaders worked to reduce adverse environmental impacts of economic
growth.36 Despite their efforts in fortifying environmental regulations,
actual implementation was less successful.37
China’s national policy for environmental protection began in the
1970s and 1980s.38 As environmental awareness increased, the government
instituted more effective environmental controls over its SEZs.39 The 1978
Chinese Constitutional provision providing for environmental protection was
codified and China’s first comprehensive national environmental legislation,
the Environmental Protection Law of 1979, was enacted. These two laws
served as a basis for environmental regulation in the SEZs.40 However, both
laws lacked characteristics essential for an effective environmental
protection system.41 First, there was a conflict in economic policy and
32

Christopher Brown et al., The Pressure of Industry on Chinese Environment: A Tale of Two South
China Cities, at 1, http://www.cwu.edu/~nsfreu/s_papers/ewconnectionsrealfinal3chris.doc (last visited Jan.
22, 2006).
33
Howard French, China’s Growing Deserts Are Suffocating Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2002.
34
Id.; Chung H. Lee, Toward Economic Cooperation in East Asia 16-17 (The European Inst. of
Japanese Studies, Working Paper No. 100, 2000).
35
Profaizer, supra note 13, at 328-29.
36
See Profaizer, supra note 13, at 329.
37
Richardson, supra note 13, at 208.
38
See
China
Information-Environmental
Protection,
http://www.asia-planet.net/china/
environmental.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
39
Shouqiu & Voigts, supra note 22, at S-27.
40
Profaizer, supra note 13, at 333.
41
Id. at 334.
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environmental policy. Specifically, China refused to recognize that
economic growth had a direct link to environmental problems.42 Second, the
constitutional and statutory language failed to keep pace with the everevolving environmental problems of economic development.43 In addition,
government officials often ignored or loosely construed SEZ laws in order to
advance rapid development.44
Further, the 1979 law had limited
enforcement mechanisms.45 Lastly, Environmental Impact Assessments
were carried out ineffectively.46
Around the same time, China’s courts were strengthened and as a
result, courts increased enforcement of environmental pollution laws and
began to hold foreigners liable for their pollution.47 In 1984, a Chinese court
required a foreign polluter to control its pollution in accordance with
Chinese standards and regulations.48
The Chinese legislature also
strengthened the judiciary’s environmental protection ability by fortifying
the right of appeals by authorizing formal appeals in the People’s Court.49
Despite this activism, the judiciary rarely participates in environmental
enforcement and government authorities often only employ administrative
and civil actions in enforcement.50
China also reworked some of the regional environmental authority.
The first SEZ laws did not make any mention of environmental controls, and
pollution and environmental degradation continued.51 In 1986, China’s State
42
Profaizer, supra note 13, at 334; see Richardson, supra note 13, at 208-9. There is an assumption
behind Chinese environmental law that the economy is a command, or planned, one, where production is
dominated by state-owned enterprises.
43
Profaizer, supra note 13, at 335. Some of the key legislation for the SEZs did not contain any
environmental protection measures and lacked specific environmental standards, which made it difficult for
local officials to enforce laws.
44
Id. at 335.
45
Id. at 333. Enforcement power was limited to criticisms, warnings, and assessment of fines
against polluters.
46
Id. at 336-37. Environmental Impact Assessments were not carried out for smaller projects and
for larger projects, it was done ineffectively. For example, The Daya Wan nuclear power plant and the
Shajiao coal power plant building permits were approved prior to the completion of Environmental Impact
Assessments. Id.
47
Id. at 339-41; see also Shouqiu & Voigts, supra note 22, at S-28. In 1984, a Chinese court
instituted fines, court costs, and forced a Hong Kong manufacturer to replace its equipment that caused air
pollution. Id.
48
Shouqiu & Voigts, supra note 22, at S-28; see also Profaizer, supra Note 13, at 340. The
appellate court in Shenzhen Municipal Shekou District Environmental Monitoring Station v. Kaida
Enterprises, Ltd., held that Kaida must satisfactorily control its pollution in accordance with standards and
regulations, and ordered injunctive relief for environmental violations, increasing the enforcement
mechanisms available which were previously only government-imposed fines. China’s Supreme Court
declared this decision as precedent to be followed.
49
Profaizer, supra note 13, at 340.
50
Id. at 341.
51
Shouqiu & Voigts, supra note 13, at S-27.
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Council passed the Provisional Regulations on Environment Management
for Economic Zones Open to Foreigners, which spelled out the duties of
foreign companies.52 The 1986 regulations contained SEZ zoning laws
which provided even greater environmental protection by allowing regional
authorities to set higher standards than their national counterparts.53
However, this regulation was not as beneficial to the environment as the
government envisioned. The 1986 regulation shifted legal authority to
regional and local authorities but this “extensive decentralisation of
responsibilities to municipal authorities . . . contributed to variable and
inconsistent implementation of environmental regulations in the SEZs.”54
Further, the regulation lacked definite measures and offered no definition for
key legal environmental mechanisms.55 In addition, SEZ managing
authorities lacked the environmental expertise necessary to implement
effective environmental regulations.56 Lastly, China’s “ubiquitous political
philosophy . . . [of] grow first, clean up later” also diminished the ability of
these managing authorities to enforce the regulations.57
The Chinese government anticipated environmental problems in its
SEZs and responded by strengthening its regulatory system. However, these
efforts had limited success because China’s “seeming successes in
environmental policy formation have not been matched by policy
implementation.”58 China’s environmental regulations were generally strict
and detailed, but China did not have the funding or technology to effectively
implement these regulations. As a result, actual environmental protection
has been a challenge.59 China’s experience provides many lessons for the
Korean government. Like the Chinese SEZs, Korea’s FEZs are likely to
attract great sums of FDI, which has a correlative relationship with
environmental degradation. The following section provides a detailed
analysis of the consequences of FDI-fueled economic growth.

52

Id. at S-28; see also Profaizer, supra note 13, at 341.
Profaizer, supra note 13, at 342-43.
54
Richardson, supra note 13, at 212.
55
Id. at 211. For example, an environmental regulation in Shenzhen SEZ places an obligation to
preserve environmental sanitation yet it does not offer a definition of what environmental sanitation is.
56
Richardson, supra note 13, at 209.
57
Id. at 153 (internal quotations omitted).
58
Id.
59
Shouqiu & Voigts, supra note 22, at S-18-19.
53
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SOUTH KOREA IS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER MANY COMPLEX
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES IN IFEZ AND MUST ASSESS ITS
REGULATORY CAPACITY TO ADDRESS THESE THREATS

Korea’s FEZs are prime candidates for receiving FDI, which has been
shown to be a contributory factor to environmental degradation in host
countries.60 Because Korea is strategically located within Northeast Asia, an
area that receives high levels of FDI, its FEZs are likely to be successful in
attracting FDI. The sheer size of Korea’s development plans in its FEZs, as
demonstrated through Songdo’s development plan, will create tremendous
environmental challenges.
Further, FDI fuels growth in FEZs at
unpredictable rates and result in greater environmental harm than anticipated
by the government.61 Without improvements to Korea’s environmental
regulatory program, ecosystems of the IFEZ are threatened by FDI and
accompanying explosive growth.
A.

Northeast Asia Is a Prime Region for Economic Growth and Korea Is
Ideally Located to Benefit from SEZs

Northeast Asia is emerging as the third biggest trading region in the
world along with the European Union and the North America Free Trade
Association.62 The Northeast Asian economy, consisting mainly of China,
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, accounts for approximately twenty percent of the
world’s Gross Domestic Product.63 Additionally, as a growing region,
Northeast Asia is a magnet for foreign investment and attracts more FDI
than any other developing country region.64 As the region grows, countries
are in a race to increase their economic competitiveness.65
SEZs are an effective means to increase economic competitiveness.
There are many types of SEZs, reflecting “different philosophies, objectives,
and means of achieving them.”66 SEZs vary depending on its adopted
60

Nicola Borregaard & Annie Dufey, Environmental Effects of Foreign Investment Versus Domestic
Investment in the Mining Sector in Latin-America, OECD Global Forum on International Investment—
Conference on Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment (2002).
61
Shen, supra note 16, at 13. For example, China’s Shenzhen SEZ grew at unpredicted rates and
faced many negative environmental effects.
62
Kab-Won Oh, Changes in the NE Asian Business Environment and the Policy Direction of the
Free Economic Zones, http://www.fez.go.kr/dbcon/down.php?file_int=119&code=e03 (last visited Jan. 21,
2006).
63
Hyo-sik Lee, N-E Asian Economic Hub Within Grasp, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004.
64
See Richardson, supra note 13, at 156.
65
See Oh, supra note 62 (“Singapore has its Industry 21 Plan, and Taiwan has its Asia Pacific
Regional Operation Center goal. . . . China the touted “factory of the world” which has been growing over
8% a year is not seeking to repeat its success in manufacturing in logistics”).
66
Richardson, supra note 13, at 161.
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models, infrastructure subsidies, investment conditions, and special or
exempt regulations.67 SEZs are designated by host countries with a primary
objective of attracting foreign investment to aid their economic growth.68
This legislative scheme has been widely used around the world. In 1987,
there were about 175 SEZs worldwide but by the late 1990s, the number had
more than quadrupled to about 850 such zones.69 The increased popularity
of SEZs as a way to further economic growth indicates that SEZs have had
success in accelerating economic growth.70
The Korean government recently passed the FEZ Act, which
encapsulates Korea’s efforts to become a Northeast Asia economic hub.71
This Act shows the government’s continued commitment to using SEZs as a
tool for economic development. The purpose of The Act on Designation and
Management of Free Economic Zone is to “facilitate foreign investments,
bolster the national competitiveness and seek the balanced development
among regions by improving the management environment for foreigninvested enterprises and living conditions for foreigners through the
designation and management of free economic zones.”72 This Act created
three FEZs: Incheon, Pusan/Jinhae, and Gwangyang.73 The Korean
government expects that these FEZs will attract foreign investment and aid
Korea in becoming a Northeast Asia economic hub.74
These Korean FEZs are likely to succeed because of Korea’s strategic
location between China and Japan, and its proximity to the resource-rich
Russian Far East.75 In addition, this Act provides many incentives including
tax incentives, government subsidies (including cash grants), relaxed
regulations, enhanced administrative services, and the establishment of
foreign schools and medical facilities.76 Further, these Korean FEZs will
67

Id.
See Bala Ramasamy & Venus T. Viana, ASEAN’s Foreign Direct Investment into the People’s
Republic of China, Discussion Paper No. 95.12, Sept. 1995, http://econ.massey.ac.nz/publications/
discuss/dp95-12.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
69
Richardson, supra note 13, at 160.
70
See generally Profaizer, supra note 13 (documenting China’s experience of tremendous growth in
its SEZs); Richardson, supra note 14 (noting East Asian countries, like China, has had economic success in
its SEZs).
71
Min-hee Kim, Revisions Inject New Dimensions in Foreign Economic Zones, KOREA NOW, Apr.
30, 2005.
72
The FEZ Act, supra note 7.
73
Lee, supra note 63.
74
Korean Real Estate Information Center, Applicable Laws: Act on Designation and Operation of
Free Economic Zones, http://www.kreic.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
75
See Lee, supra note 63.
76
INCHEON FREE ECONOMIC ZONE, Investment Guide, http://ifez.go.kr/eng/sub5/a_body.asp (last
visited Jan. 21, 2006).
68
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feature “business friendly environments, attractive tourist destinations, and
state of the art logistical and industrial facilities.”77
Because of its strategic location and FEZ incentives, Korea is likely to
attract huge sums of foreign investment in its FEZs, which in turn is likely to
fuel uncontrollable rates of economic and population growth. IFEZ has
already attracted billions of dollars within Songdo City, including a
committed $12.7 billion investment by the U.S.-based Gale Corporation.78
Uncontrollable growth is likely and without proactive environmental
management, IFEZ will suffer from environmental harm.
B.

Foreign Direct Investment in Special Economic Zones Leads to
Environmental Degradation in Host Countries

One of the main purposes of SEZs is to attract FDI,79 which often has
a profound impact on the environment.80 Countries seek FDI despite the
danger of negative environmental impacts because FDI has positive effects
on the host country’s economic growth.81 Evidence suggests that an
“inverted-U” relationship exists between pollution and economic
development, called the “Environmental Kuznets Curve.”82 In the beginning
stages of economic development, environmental degradation tends to be
high, but as the host country’s economy matures, the rate of environmental
degradation slows. This change of eventual improvement following initial
environmental deterioration reflects a country’s increased demand for
environmental protection.83 Eventually, as a host country’s economy
develops, environmental regulations are strengthened, and the influx of
environmentally protective technology slows pollution. However, studies

77

Id.
Gale Company: American Entrepreneur Investing $12.7 Billion in New Songdo City, KOREA IT
TIMES, Aug. 2004, available at http://ittimes.co.kr/en/node.asp?em=M&mcode=200408&subcode=L20&
idx=114.
79
See Mark Yaolin Wang & Xiaochen Meng, Global Local Initiatives in FDI: The Experience of
Shenzhen, China , ASIA PACIFIC VIEWPOINT, Aug. 2004, 181, 183 (Chinese government has attempted to
direct FDI to its SEZs).
80
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY COMMITTEE, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, Environmental Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment: A Literature Review 7 (2002).
Countries seek FDI even though it may have negative environmental impacts because FDI has direct
positive effects on the host country’s economic growth. Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 11.
83
Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment, 110 Q.J. ECON.
353, 369-70. There is no evidence that would suggest that economic growth unavoidably harms the natural
environment, but there is an association of economic growth with deteriorations in environmental
conditions in poorer countries. Id.
78
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conflict as to the true effects of FDI on the environment.84 This is because
the environmental effects from activities of foreign investors are hard to
separate from the domestic effects and cannot be analyzed independently
from other related factors.85
Environmental effects from economic
development are studied by looking at “scale effects (effects from expansion
of economic output), structural effects (effects from changes or reallocation
of production and consumption), and technology effects (spill-over effects
from technological development and diffusion).”86 Scale effects generally
tend to be negative, whereas the technological and structural effects tend to
be positive.87 However, overall environmental quality is measured by “net
effects.”88 While opinions differ, evidence indicates that the net effects of
FDI are “often an accomplice to environmental degradation.”89 Altogether,
economic growth is associated with deteriorating environmental conditions
in poorer countries.
Korea has been described as a newly industrialized country90 and is
currently known to have high environmental awareness.91 With its stronger
environmental regulations, modeled after regulations in the United States,
Korea is poised to avoid the destruction witnessed in China’s SEZs.
However, many challenges exist for Korea, particularly the inability to
84

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY COMMITTEE, supra note 80, at 10.
Id.
86
Id. Net effects are the cumulative effect of scale effects, structural effects, and technological
effects. Borregard & Dufey, supra note 60, at 9. Other studies have also considered FDI effects on the
regulatory and policy environment. Id. at 17. FDI is expected to put an upward, positive pressure on the
host country’s environmental regulations and policies.
87
Richardson, supra note 13, at 197.
88
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY COMMITTEE, supra note 80, at 10-22; see also Borregard & Dufey,
supra note 60, at 8-9. “Scale effects” are measurements of environmental impact resulting from
incremental increases in economic activity. As trade and investment expand, the use of natural resources is
also expected to increase. Generally, scale effects are expected to be negative. “Technological effects”
measure effects from new or better technologies that arrive at a host country as a result of FDI.
Technological effects are expected to be generally positive, or at a minimum, neutral, because technologies
of advanced countries are often more efficient, pollute less, and consume fewer resources. “Structural
effects” refer to changes in patterns of economic activity. They tend to be positive since FDI generally
“promote[s] allocative efficiency among economies.” Essentially, this means that “goods will be produced
with lower input and capital per unit of output world-wide.” In developing countries there is a recent
structural shift toward service and away from resource processing, which is regarded as particularly
beneficial from an environmental perspective. Id.
89
Richardson, supra note 13, at 199 (internal quotations omitted).
90
George Curran, Pacific Rim Environmental Regulation: A Western Perspective of Several
Countries’ Environmental Liability Laws, 3 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 47, 56 (1994).
91
The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/kr (last visited January 22, 2006); United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Virtual Conference, Korea’s vision making
process, http://www.unescap.org/drpad/vc/conference/bg_kr_13_kvm.htm (last visited January 22, 2006);
see also Joon Hyoung Lim & Shui-Yan Tang, Democratization and Environmental Policy-Making in
Korea, 15 GOVERNANCE 561, 566 (2002) (noting that civic organizations in Korea have been active in
cultivating public’s awareness of environmental problems).
85
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effectively implement its environmental regulations.
Environmental
regulations are only effective if they are well-administered and implemented
in a manner adequate to achieve their goals. Effective implementation is
hindered when a country is unwilling to control its development in order to
lessen its environmental harms.92 Many developing countries, like China
and Mexico, have neglected environmental protection and instead took steps
to stimulate economic development in the past.93 By identifying the flaws in
Korea’s current environmental regulatory regime, the following section
argues that Korea, if it follows China’s lead, faces the same potentially
negative environmental consequences.
C.

The Proposed Plan of Songdo City Demonstrates that Severe
Environmental Stresses Are Likely

Songdo City is the first city to be developed under IFEZ and is the
centerpiece of the IFEZ.94 All of the three Korean FEZs are along the
coastline. Songdo City will be built on reclaimed lands and will become
home to approximately 487,300 people upon completion.95 The construction
of this new city will occur over approximately ten years and is projected to
end in year 2020.96 As with any new development, the construction of
infrastructure, including systems of roads and utilities, is required.
Environmental challenges with Songdo City are greatly multiplied by the
fact that development will occur on miles of shoreline within Incheon Bay.97
Shorelines are delicate ecosystems, which once disturbed, are hard to
restore.98 Development brings human, agricultural, and industrial pollutants
92

Shouqiu &Voigts, supra note 22, at S-17.
See L. Ortiz-Lozano et al., Environmental Evaluation and Development Problems of the Mexico
Coastal Zone, in OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 48, 161 (2005); see also Shouqiu & Voigts, supra note 22, at
S-27.
94
See generally Bang Hee-seok & Park Keun-sik, Factors to Be Considered for Improving Free
Economic Zone in Korea, http://faculty.washington.edu/karyiu/confer/xian05/papers/bang.pdf (last visited
Jan. 21, 2006).
95
Soh-jung Yoo & Je-hae Do, Incheon Free Economic Zone Key to Korea’s Hub Dream, KOREA
NOW, Aug. 23, 2003, available at http://kn.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2003/08/23/
200308230007.asp.
96
INCHEON FREE ECONOMIC ZONE, Directions of Development, http://ifez.go.kr/eng/sub4/
a_body.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
97
See Charles W. Finkl & Steve L. Krupa, Environmental Impacts of Coastal-Plain Activities on
Sandy Beach Systems: Hazards, Perception and Mitigation, J. COASTAL RES., SI 35, 132 (2003); see also
Ortiz-Lozano, supra note 94; Dong Oh Cho & Stephen B. Olsen, The Status and Prospects for Coastal
Management in Korea, 31 COASTAL MGMT. 98, 98-199 (2003). Korea’s western coast borders the Yellow
Sea, which, although one of the world’s most productive fishing grounds, has seen significant decline in
recent years.
98
A. Chidi Ibe, The Coastal Zone and Oceanic Problems of Sub-Saharan Africa, in SUSTAINING THE
FUTURE: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (George Benneh,
93
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which increase over time as an area grows.99 Further, Korea’s coastlines
have been exposed to huge reclamation projects in the past and currently
about forty percent of all tidal areas have been destroyed by reclamation.100
Incheon Bay is already environmentally stressed from the reclamation work
for IFEZ and the recent development of the Incheon International Airport.101
Other problems include habitat destruction, decline in water quality, loss of
natural resources, loss of aquatic species, and health hazards from waste,
etc.102 Songdo will face tremendous environmental challenges during
development, and perpetual environmental pollution is likely to occur.103
Additional development of Cheongna and Yeongjong will only amplify
those impacts within Incheon Bay.
Consequently, water quality and coastal management are two large
issues in development of Korea’s FEZs.
Korea’s Water Quality
Conservation Act (“WQCA”) and Coastal Zone Management Act (“Korean
CZMA”) are based on the U.S. Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and the Coastal
Zone Management Act (“U.S. CZMA”), which are recognized as effective
environmental regulations in the United States. However, an assessment of
Korea’s current environmental regulatory regime and a comparison of
Korea’s WQCA and CZMA with United States’ equivalent CWA and CZMA
reveal inadequacies in Korea’s laws.
IV.

KOREA MUST ASSESS ITS CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY
REGIME AND CONSIDER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. LAWS UPON
WHICH IT IS MODELED

Korea’s environmental regulatory regime has undergone significant
changes and currently has a number of good regulations in place, modeled
after U.S. regulations. Both the Basic Environmental Policy Act and the
Environmental Impact Assessment Act were patterned after U.S. provisions.
Despite this fact, the Korean environmental regulatory system still has some
William B. Morgan & Juha I. Uitto eds., 1996), available at http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/
80918e/80918E0p.htm.
99
Id.
100
Chul-Hwan Koh, The Korean Tidal Flats: Reclamation vs. Conservation, KOREAN FEDERATION
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT NEWS, Summer 1998, Issue 1.
101
John Kasarda, Asia’s Emerging Airport Cities, URBAN LAND ASIA, Dec. 2004, available at
http://japan.uli.org/pdf/ula_mag_feature_p18.pdf (IFEZ is being developed on reclaimed land); Airport
Technology, Incheon International Airport, South Korea, http://www.airport-technology.com/projects/
incheon/ (last visited May 20, 2006) (Incheon International Airport was developed on reclaimed lands).
102
See Ortiz-Lozano et. al., supra note 93.
103
Michael Kennish,, Environmental Threats and Environmental Future of Estuaries, 29 ENVTL.
CONSERVATION 78, 78-107 (2002) (Environmental challenges will result from shoreline development and
related growth).
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areas which require improvement. A comparison between Korea’s WQCA
and CZMA with the U.S. CWA and U.S. CZMA shows deficiencies in
Korean environmental regulatory system.
A.

Korea’s Existing Environmental Regulatory System Appears to Be an
Effective System but It Lacks Adequate Implementation

Korea’s environmental regulatory regime did not take off until
Koreans were faced with severe environmental challenges. After the Korean
War, the Korean government was primarily concerned with economic
development and less with environmental concerns.104 Having achieved
great economic prosperity since the War, public concerns over their
environmental surroundings and how it affected their quality of life
increased in Korea.105 This resulted in a strong political demand for better
environmental protection measures106 and an increased effort to address the
country’s growing environmental problems.107 Korea’s past environmental
laws were generally ineffective.108
Currently, the backbone of Korean environmental regulation is the
Basic Environmental Policy Act (“BEPA”),109 which closely tracks the
United States’ National Environmental Policy Act.110 It sets forth “general
principles, fundamental policies, and an administrative framework for
environmental preservation and remediation.”111 Under the umbrella of
104
Richard J. Ferris, Jr., Aspiration and Reality in Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore:
An Introduction to the Environmental Regulatory Systems of Asia’s Four New Dragons, 4 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 125, 159-60 (1993); see also Hong Sik Cho, Law and Politics in Environmental Protection: A
Case Study on Korea, 2 J. KOREAN L. 103 (2002) (hereinafter Cho, Law and Politics in Environmental
Protection).
105
Cho, Law and Politics in Environmental Protection, supra note 104, at 48.
106
Id.
107
Hong Sik Cho, An Overview of Korean Environmental Law, 29 ENVTL. L. 501, 503 (1999)
(hereinafter Cho, An Overview of Korean Environmental Law). As a first step, the Korean government
reworked the existing environmental regulations in place and developed new laws modeled after that of the
United States. Id. At the same time, the Ministry of Environment (“MOE”) was established in place of the
Environmental Administration, and had full ministry status. See Ferris, supra note 104, at 162-3.
Comprised of bureaus that delegate most duties to regional subunits, the MOE is a “network of related
entities which implement MOE’s policies with difficulty and are frequently hindered by a general lack of
cooperation from other ministries. Ferris, supra note 104, at 161.
108
Cho, An Overview of Korean Environmental Law, supra note 107, at 505. Korea’s first
environmental laws, the Pollution Prevention Act and the Environmental Protection Act, were ineffective
primarily due to the lack of enforcement. The Pollution Prevention Act was ineffective because it lacked
an administrative agency to oversee and enforce its regulations. The Environmental Protection Act,
enacted in 1977 and providing for both administrative and criminal sanctions, lacked strict enforcement.
Id.
109
Basic Environmental Policy Act of 1990, No. 4257.
110
Id. at 505-6.
111
Id. at 507.
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BEPA are national and local environmental regulations which are more
specific, targeting environmental areas such as air and water quality, and
solid waste.112 BEPA also includes in its definition of “environment,” noise,
vibration, and odor, etc.113 These specific environmental regulations remain
in effect as long as they are consistent with BEPA.114 BEPA contains a strict
liability standard for polluters and allows national and local governments to
establish environmental quality standards.115
Korea’s Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIA”) is one of the
major problems with Korea’s environmental regulatory system. The EIA
originated from the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.116 The
Environmental Conservation Act of 1977 established the Environmental
Impact Assessment procedure.117 The EIA went through several reforms,
and in 1993, it became an independent law as the Environmental Impact
Assessment Act.118 The EIA Act has been revised many times in order to
make it a more effective regulation but several observations point to the
conclusion that the Act has not been as successful.119 In particular,
economic development policies have received much attention while
environmental protection policies have received less. This had the effect of
undermining the Korean environmental regulatory system.
One major problem with the EIA Act is that those preparing the EIA
are the people that are undertaking the project; this reduces objectiveness
and fairness is not guaranteed.120 The second problem lies with scoping and
reviewing of the environmental impact statements.121 Generally, because of
other responsibilities, the EIAs are often not reviewed by a committee
formed under the EIA Act or a recommended group of experts.122 In
addition, the EIA consultation process is problematic and has only been

112

Id.
Jiwhan So, Environmental Law of Korea, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
at KOR-17 (Robinson, Nicholas ed., 2000).
114
Cho, An Overview of Korean Environmental Law, supra note 107, at 505.
115
Id.
116
So, supra note 113, at 19.
117
See Richardson, supra note 13, at 189.
118
JAEYONG CHOI ET AL., KOREA ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE, Comparative Study on the
Environmental Impact Assessment Between the Republic of Korea and China—In Case of Golf Courses, at
WO-05 (2003); So, supra note 113, at 19. Environmental Impact Assessment, prior to becoming enacted as
a separate act, was one chapter of the Basic Environmental Policy Act.
119
So, supra note113, at KOR 19-20.
120
Id. at KOR-19. In the U.S., the Environmental Impact Statements are prepared under the
supervision of and in consultation with government agencies.
121
Id.
122
Id.
113
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implemented at a rate of fifty-seven percent.123 Lastly, the EIA suffers from
government’s policy placing priority on development rather than the
environment.124 One example of government’s failure with the EIA can be
seen through the Shi-Hwa project. The Korean EIA Act requires that the
assessment be prepared by the time of public notice. However, the EIA for
the Shi-Hwa lake project was prepared nine months after public notice.125
After spending over two-thirds of a billion dollars on the project, the water
quality of the lake deteriorated beyond repair, and the Shi-Hwa lake project
was scrapped.126
In an effort to address these issues and improve its environmental
administrative system, Korea adopted the Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”) in 1998. The APA allows private citizens to participate in various
government activities, a legislative effort which is the first of its kind in
Korea.127 By enacting the APA, the Korean government is showing its
willingness to increase its environmental responsibility. However, the APA
is useless without effective implementation and administration.
B.

A Comparison of the Korean Water Quality Conservation Act with the
United States’ Clean Water Act Reveals Deficiencies in the Korean Act

The United States’ Clean Water Act of 1972128 is considered to be the
United States’ most effective and resilient pollution control law.129 The
CWA has facilitated a great deal of progress in water quality since its
enactment.130 Rivers and lakes that were once polluted have become
recreational spots for picnicking, boating and other waterfront related
activities.131 The CWA has also been successful in reducing the rate of
wetland loss and reducing the amount of oil spills into U.S. waters.132
123

Id. at 20.
Id.
125
Cho, Law and Politics in Environmental Protection, supra note 104, at 54 (emphasis added). The
EIA process for the Shiwha project was nothing but a sham and “reveals how backward environmentrelated law practice has been” in Korea. Id.
126
Id.; see also Manik Hwang, Coastal Land-Use Change By Reclamation of Tidal-Flats Along the
Western Coast of the Capital Region in Korea, at 6, available at http://www.cger.nies.go.jp/lugec/
Proceedings/12)Manik%20Hwang.pdf. Shi-Hwa, a freshwater lake newly created through a 12.4 kilometer
dike, had deteriorated in water quality to a point beyond repair due to uncontrolled inflow of wastewater to
a point beyond repair. The dike was broken and the Shiwha lake water was discharged into the ocean. Id.
127
Cho, An Overview of Korean Environmental Law, supra note 107, at 511.
128
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-97, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (2000).
129
See Andreen , supra note 17, at 537.
130
Industry discharges have been reduced and dissolved oxygen levels have increased all over the
country. Id. at 591.
131
Id. at 591-2.
132
Id. at 592.
124
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However, the CWA has also been criticized.133 One of the biggest
criticisms is that the CWA has not achieved its principal goals: It has not
eliminated all discharges into water and has not created fishable and
swimmable waters throughout the United States.134 The CWA’s failure to
achieve its goals results from a number of factors. Permit compliance is
inconsistent and many industrial facilities fail to meet pretreatment
standards.135 In addition, the CWA also does not address non-point source
pollution136 and “[a]s a consequence, non-point source pollution has evolved
into the largest single obstacle to improving water quality.”137 Another large
problem with water quality is one of hydrologic modification,138 which the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has deemed the second
leading source of water quality impairment for United States rivers, lakes,
and streams.139
The structure of administering the CWA also presents challenges. In
the CWA, federal agencies have a dominant role in regulation but state
agencies retain rights such as water allocation.140 This results in legal
differences between water quality and water quantity; water quality is now
managed by federal agencies under the CWA but water quantity remains an
area of law under state control.141 Consequently, the EPA lacks programs or
requirements that would effectively integrate water allocation as part of a
comprehensive water quality program.142 Additionally, individual states
have not addressed this problem and regulate water quality and quantity
through different agencies without much communication or cooperation.143
133

Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning From More than Five-And-A-Half Decades of Federal Water
Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 578
(2005).
134
Id. at 578; see also Reed D. Benson, Pollution Without Solution: Flow Impairment Problems
Under the Clean Water Act Section 303, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 199, 265 (2005) (internal quotations
omitted) (“The CWA has not achieved its primary objective of restoring and maintaining the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”).
135
Andreen, supra note 17, at 537.
136
Id. at 543.
137
Andreen, supra note 17, at 593. The CZMA authorizes states to regulate non-point pollution
sources but CZMA jurisdiction is limited to coastal waters and do not extend to freshwater bodies. See
Paul L. Sorisio, Poultry, Waste, and Pollution: The Lack of Enforcement of Maryland’s Water Quality
Improvement Act, 62 MD. L. REV 1054, 1061 (2003).
138
Hydrologic Modification, http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/nps/pdf/va_hydrologicmodification.pdf
(last visited Feb. 23, 2006). Hydrologic modification is the modification of stream flow by human
activities.
139
Benson, supra note 134, at 201.
140
33 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (2006); see Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations for Water
Law, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1018-19 (2005).
141
Id.
142
See Benson, supra note 134, at 204-05.
143
Id.
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Overall, while water quality in the United States has improved as a result of
the CWA, problems still remain.144
A close analysis of Korea’s WQCA shows that the Korean regulation
has problems similar to the CWA. On the surface, the WQCA appears to be
a good, effective law. The purpose of the WQCA is to preserve public health
and prevention of environmental harm from water pollution.145 The WQCA
specifies permissible discharge standards and requires permits from the
Ministry of Environment (“MOE”) for the installation of discharge facilities
(both wastewater and non-wastewater) and preventive facilities.146 The
WQCA also allows the MOE to assess non-compliance charges, to suspend
operations of discharge facilities if inspections indicate that the facility
exceeds its allowed discharge totals, and to revoke permits.147 Chapter IX of
the WQCA provides for penal provisions for failure to comply with the
Act.148 The WQCA addresses non-point source discharges but limits its
scope only to the usage of agricultural chemicals and specifies that certain
agricultural chemicals cannot be used in golf courses.149 The Enforcement
Decree for the WQCA150 provides for designation, computation of daily
discharge, exemptions, inspections and reports, and most importantly,
delegates authority to regional subunits with supervision from MOE.151
Although the WQCA appears to be a good water conservation law in
general, it still has problems similar to the CWA. It does not adequately
address non-point source pollution because its scope is limited to the use of
agricultural chemicals in golf courses. In the United States, non-point
source discharge has become one of the biggest contributors to water quality
144
Mark F. Sudol & Richard F. Ambrose, The US Clean Water Act and Habitat Replacement:
Evaluation of Mitigation Sites in Orange Country, California, USA, 30 ENVTL. MGMT. 727-734 (2002).
The regulation of wetlands per section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act and section 404 of the Clean
Water Act has had limited success in implementation. Mitigation of wetlands as authorized by the CWA
has not had much success since mitigation sites are usually not successful. Lack of successes in mitigation
sites result from lack of information and insufficient understanding of wetland functions, and also from
inadequate compliance efforts by regulatory agencies. A study using quantitative evaluation in California,
U.S.A., found that mitigation sites in a study area resulted in the loss of 126 hectares of wetlands, with only
72 hectares of the mitigation considered successful. The same study using qualitative evaluation showed
that only 26 hectares of the mitigation sites were successful after 126 hectares of wetlands were lost to
development projects.
145
So, supra note 113, at KOR-22.
146
WQCA, supra note 19, arts. 8-11.
147
Id. arts. 17, 19, 20.
148
Id. ch. IX.
149
Id. arts. 46-2, 47.
150
Enforcement Decree of the Water Quality Conservation Act, Amended by Presidential Decree No.
18796, Apr. 22, 2005 (hereinafter Enforcement Decree of WQCA). Also found in The Statues of Republic
of Korea, Volume 18, Part 37, Environment (Korea Legislation Research Institute).
151
Id.
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problems. Similar to the CWA, the WQCA does not address water quantity
in the regulation of water quality.152 Inadequate consideration of water
quantity in the regulation of water quality has been a problem in both the
United States and Korea. Additionally, enforcement and administration of
all environmental regulations has been problematic in Korea.153
C.

The Korean Coastal Zone Management Act, Which Was Modeled After
the United States’ Coastal Zone Management Act, Is Inadequate to
Protect Korea’s FEZs Against Environmental Harm

The United States’ Coastal Zone Management Act aims to protect
estuaries and coastal wetlands, provide public access to shores, mitigate
negative impacts of coastal development, and accommodate different coastal
uses.154 The U.S. CZMA is a model of good balance in integrating distinct
but complementary roles for federal, state, and local governments in
achieving coastline protection.155 This management style is known as
“cooperative federalism,” whereby states voluntarily assume much of the
administrative and enforcement responsibilities.156
Under the U.S.
CZMA,157 states are responsible for developing a state Coastal Zone
Management Plan (“CZMP”) according to the guidelines of the U.S.
CZMA.158 The U.S. CZMA also does not provide for a private right of
action for a federal agency’s failure to meet the consistency requirements.159
Similarly, the U.S. CZMA does not provide state agencies with a right of
action to sue private citizens who act without the approval of a federal
permit for activities in coastlines.160
Implementation of the U.S. CZMA has been problematic as well.
Since the CWA does not regulate non-point source pollution, Congress
attempted to force states to manage non-point source pollution in 1990 by
withholding state funding unless they were in compliance with this new
152

See WQCA, supra note 19.
For discussion on problems of Korean environmental law, see discussion supra Part IV.
154
See Edward M. Cheston, An Overview and Analysis of the Consistency Requirement Under the
Coastal Zone Management Act, 10 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 135, 136 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).
155
Lynne Z. Hale, Achieving Integration in Coastal Management: The Challenge of Linking National
and Local Levels of Government, http://www.crc.uri.edu/download/HAL_0020.pdf (last visited May 20,
2006).
156
Cheston, supra note 154, at 136 (Congress left some control to the states because coastal
management was traditionally an area regulated by state authority).
157
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-65 (2000).
158
16 U.S.C. § 1455 (setting forth the guidelines of the Act).
159
Cheston, supra note 154, at 146. Private citizens can, however, bring an action under a different
legal theory.
160
Id. at 145.
153
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CZMA provision.161 However, even a decade after the enactment of this
provision, only a few states have created and adopted non-point source
pollution control measures.162 The success of this provision in the CZMA is
unclear.163
Similarly, comparing the Korean Coastal Zone Management Act of
1999 (“Korean CZMA”) with the U.S. CZMA shows that Korean
administrative and implementation procedures need to be amended. Korea’s
coastal areas face many environmental pressures.164 There is a high demand
for coastal developments, like the IFEZ, although they often lead to the loss
of wetlands, declining water quality and declines in fisheries.165
The Korean CZMA was adopted in 1999 and gave the Ministry of
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (“MOMAF”) jurisdiction over all coastal
areas. However, within the “terrestrial zone,” which includes all shorelines
extending 500 meters inland from the mean high watermark166 (one
kilometer from where the shoreline has been developed into harbors, ports
and industrial complexes), MOMAF does not have a direct regulatory
function, but only a coordinating and planning function.167 The Korean
CZMA regulates via a three-tier system involving the National Coastal Zone
Management Plan (“CZMP”), regional CZMP, and the Coastal Zone
Readjustment Plan.168 The National CZMP was mandated by legislation to
be developed within a year of the enactment of the Korean CZMA.169
Within the framework of the national CZMP, local and regional governments
can voluntarily elect to develop regional CZMPs.170 If the local or regional
governments do not elect to do so or do not have the resources to develop

161

See Sorisio, supra note 137, at 1061.
Id.
163
Andrew Solomon, Section 6217 of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendment of 1990: Is
there Any Point?, 31 ENVTL. L. 151, 183 (2001) (predicting that the US CZMA provision that attempts to
force states to regulate non-point source pollution is not likely to succeed because it lacks sufficient
incentives or punishments).
164
See Cho & Olsen, supra note 97, at 99. Rapid development of Korea’s coastlines has brought
“loss of coastal wetlands and estuaries, degraded water quality and declines in nearshore fisheries.” Id.
165
Dong-Oh Cho, A Study on Principles and Strategy for ICZM in Korea, 17 COASTAL MGMT. RES.
65, 65-70.
166
Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Glossary,
http://chl.wes.army.mil/library/glossary/m.htp (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). Mean High Water is the average
height of the high waters over a 19 year period. Id.
167
See Dong-Oh Cho, supra note 165, at 71.
168
See Cho & Olsen, supra note 97, at 112.
169
Dong-Oh Cho, supra note 165, at 72.
170
Id. at 71
162
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their own CZMPs, MOMAF will develop a regional CZMP171 that identifies
actions to enhance and restore the coastal areas.172
Korea’s CZMA is criticized for its centralized approach. The Korean
CZMA allocates responsibility among different levels of government but has
not been successful in making such allocation effective and efficient.173 The
approach does not provide for the explicit delegation of power and authority
to local and regional governments.174 Local governments have limited
resources and are given minor roles. From their point of view, further
coastal development is desirable because that will provide for a larger
economic base.175 Another major shortcoming of the Korean CZMA is the
restriction in its jurisdiction.176 This Korean CZMA is limited to areas
below mean high water marks, and the regulations of coastal development
on terrestrial areas belong to a different government agency, the Ministry of
Construction and Transportation.177 Another limitation of the Korean CZMA
is the CZMPs’ questionable authority over other relevant laws or plans
which were implemented before the CZMPs came along.178 There are
several regulations which explicitly or indirectly deal with coastal areas but
there is a lack of direction regarding which law or plan has greater
authority.179
V.

KOREA MUST RE-PRIORITIZE ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS OVER
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ORDER TO MAKE EXISTING
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS EFFECTIVE

Although Korea is more concerned about the environment today and
greater public awareness and participation in environmental affairs exists,
Korea still emphasizes economic development over environmental vitality.
Asian exporting industries fear that higher environmental standards threaten
their international competitiveness.180 However, economic studies do not
provide solid empirical support for this belief.181 Although tough
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environmental regulations can impede or discourage FDI in some industries,
it is not appropriate to conclude that FDI alone dictates the direction of FDI
flow.182 Despite this indefiniteness, politicians and business people continue
to firmly believe that strict environmental regulations will hurt economic
competitiveness.183 As a result, the Korean government is often influenced
away from active enforcement of its environmental regulations.
Since the 1960’s, the Korean government has been committed to
improving its national economy and increasing its per capita income.184 In
order to “accelerate economic growth, the government placed the first
national priority on the development of industrial bases.”185 Korea’s desire
to advance economically contributed to tremendous environmental
deterioration186 because Korea ignored environmental protection.187 A recent
reclamation project demonstrates Korea’s continuing preference for
economic development over environmental health. The “Saemangeum”
project, which was an effort to convert tidal flats into large farmlands, had
tremendous negative environmental consequences.188
Despite
environmental concerns related to this dike construction project,189 the
Korean government in 2001 pushed ahead with this reclamation project
because it was unwilling to cancel a project that was over seventy percent
complete, and towards which the government invested over one billion
dollars.190
Korea’s policy to advance economic development is also indicated by
the lack of environmental regulations specific to Korea’s SEZs and newly
created FEZs. Korea lacks environmental regulation specifically for its
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SEZs, including the newly designated FEZs.191 Instead, it relies on existing
environmental regulations to guide development in the FEZs without
additional considerations. There is also some evidence that environmental
standards may be waived or overlooked for investments within the SEZs.192
Despite such evidence, the FEZ Act still provides that the “possibility of
securing the environmentally sound and sustainable development” is a
matter to be considered by the FEZ committee.193 It provides that a plan for
an FEZ must include a “program for environmental preservation.”194 On the
other hand, the Korean legislature permits authorities to reduce or waive any
environmental impact assessment levies, charges, or fees.195 Similarly,
approval by the Minister of Finance and Economy supersedes other
environmental or planning approvals.196 These provisions by the Korean
government put the environment at grave risk and displace any other
environmental protection measures in place.197
VI.

KOREA MUST CAPITALIZE ON THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM CHINA’S
SEZS AND THE U.S. CWA AND CZMA IN ORDER TO MITIGATE THE
POTENTIAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN KOREA’S FEZS

Korea can take actions to reduce the potential for environmental harm
in IFEZ by avoiding the mistakes made by the Chinese and implementing
effective environmental regulations specific to FEZs.198 A greater emphasis
on environmental protection rather than economic development would also
aid in reducing environmental harms. Korea should also amend its WCQA
and CZMA in order to avoid the inadequacies revealed in the U.S. CWA and
CZMA. Finally, Korea should address: 1) inadequate implementation; 2)
narrow definitions of standing in environmental actions; 3) problems with
judicial review; and 4) inadequate remedies in environmental actions.
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Korea Must Take Specific Actions to Avoid the Environmental
Degradation Experienced in China’s SEZs

In order to avoid the environmental degradation experienced by
China’s SEZs, the Korean government must take some bold steps towards
strengthening its environmental regulatory system. One of the problems
with China’s SEZ was lack of expertise in its environmental managing
authorities. Korea, similar to China, has a decentralized system of
environmental regulation and some evidence of non-enforcement of
environmental regulations in the FEZs.199 Korea must require high
standards of expertise in environmental managing authorities and carefully
monitor the effects of decentralization. In addition, Korea does not have a
system of environmental regulations specifically for its FEZs. China
developed a system of regulations putting greater environmental protection
measures for its SEZs. Similarly, Korea should assess the need for stronger
regulations in its FEZs and if necessary, develop new regulations targeted
towards development in the nation’s FEZs.
B.

Korea Should Place a Greater Emphasis on Environmental Protection
and Less on Economic Development

Korea is an industrializing nation with potential for further economic
growth. Growing importance exists over environmentalism, following the
country’s experience with environmental degradation during its industrial
growth era. Although growing environmentalism is positive, it is
insufficient. As a country with high levels of environmental awareness,
Korea must reconsider its priorities and place greater importance on
environmental protection.
Korea’s governmental authorities should
recognize that stringent environmental regulations do not hinder economic
growth and act responsibly in protecting its vulnerable ecosystem.
C.

Korea Should Amend Its WQCA and CZMA in Order to Avoid the
Inadequacies Revealed in the U.S. CWA and CZMA

Part IV examined the deficiencies in two of Korea’s key
environmental regulations for its FEZs, the WQCA and the Korea CZMA,
by comparing them with the U.S. CWA and CZMA, the models for Korean
regulations. This section makes specific recommendations to improve the
effectiveness of Korea’s two key environmental provisions for its FEZs.
199
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Korea’s water quality program and the coastal management program
need to be amended to address existing problems that hinder the
achievement of water quality and coastal protection goals. Expanding the
WQCA to regulate broader areas of non-point sources of pollutant
discharges and including the regulation of water quantity as an additional
method of water quality management is essential in order to maintain and
improve Korea’s water quality. Further, integrating all laws that impact
coastal areas under the MOMAF is mandatory, and incentives should be
given so that local governments can participate in national and regional
CZM plans. Korea should also develop efficient cooperative models
between all agencies that have jurisdiction in coastal areas. Another option
would be to extend MOMAF’s regulatory authority over coastal
development projects which are currently under the jurisdiction of different
ministries. This type of gradual strategy is crucial to overcoming both legal
and government agency barriers to coastal protection.
D.

Korea Must Effectively Implement the Environmental Regulations
Already in Place

Korea has well-developed environmental regulations, but its
administrative practice in implementing environmental regulations is not as
developed.200 Korea does not implement environmental regulations to the
same extent as developed countries, and this may have disastrous results.201
There is a huge concern because “even if the legislature passes
environmentally ambitious legislation, the bureaucracy vitiates its goal by
administrative practice.”202 An example of this occurrence is clearly evident
in the Saemangeum project.203 This reclamation project received much
criticism and opposition because the government pushed ahead with the
controversial despite their awareness that creating a freshwater lake posed
environmental problems and were aware of public criticisms. The Ministry
of Environment and many environmental groups opposed this project.204
Korea should improve its implementation of environmental regulations
through better coordination and a concerted effort between different
governmental agencies.
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Korea Must Broaden the Definition of Citizen Standing in
Environmental Actions

One of the greatest challenges of Korean environmental regulation is
the lack of opportunities for citizen participation.205 Korea must allow for
additional opportunities for citizen participation by broadening its standing
requirements and by granting citizens additional rights to intervene in
government actions.
Korea’s judiciary system, with its unclear jurisprudence regarding
citizen standing in environmental suits, contributes to the poor
environmental regulatory regime.206 Though the right to a healthy
environment is a Constitutional right,207 the Constitution does not provide
for concrete and direct civil rights automatically, making it difficult to
determine what and who is protected.208 Korean courts use the legal interest
test for standing, which means that a plaintiff who seeks legal redress for
environmental harm must demonstrate some type of specific injury to his or
her own legal interest.209 Standing is “so narrowly formulated that any
litigation to vindicate collective interest is not allowed.”210 Thus, unless an
environmental statute contains protections for private individuals, a citizen
or the general public cannot bring suit and seek judicial review for
environmental harm.211 In the United States, this problem is mitigated by
important and effective statutory provisions for citizen suits.212 However,
Korea’s regulatory system lacks similar provisions. Relaxing standing
requirements to citizens and environmental groups allows such groups to
bring enforcement actions and increase the efficiency of environmental
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regulations.213 Korea should adopt new provisions giving citizens increased
standing in environmental suits.
F.

Korea Must Broaden Its Definition of Justiciability for Purposes of
Judicial Review

In addition to increasing citizen standing, Korea must provide the
public with additional opportunities to intervene in governmental actions.
Because a government agency’s environmental determination will be subject
to judicial review only if it involves an “administrative disposition,”214 it
further complicates judicial enforcement. An example of an administrative
disposition is when a government agency exercises public powers, like
rejecting development permit applications.215 When a government agency is
using its private powers, like purchasing a fleet of cars for government use,
it is not subject to judicial review.216 This has been problematic since
Korean courts have held that environmental impact assessments are an
exercise of private power, not subject to judicial review.217 This means that
the only time that a private citizen can bring a suit for an environmental
disposition is when an agency makes a final disposition on the project.
Typically, by that time, the proposed project is likely to have been completed
or is at least nearing completion.218 At such time, a citizen suit would be
useless. Another problem is that courts are very deferential to agency
decisions.219 This is disadvantageous to the public and makes victory in
environmental suits difficult. Providing the means for the public to
intervene in government actions before environmental harm is done is
necessary for a better environmental regulatory system in Korea.
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Korea Must Enact Sufficient Judicial Remedies in Environmental
Actions

Korea does not have adequate judicial remedies available to
environmental victims and must develop a system to compensate those who
are harmed.220 Because the right to standing in an environmental suit is
limited, citizens have attempted suits under tort or nuisance claims.
However, because the environmental regulatory system requires that injury
be demonstrated to bring a suit under these theories, citizens whose property
was not directly harmed cannot bring a suit.221 Further, as a civil law
country, Korea does not award unforeseen extraordinary, nominal, or
punitive damages.222 Injunctive relief is also unavailable in the Korean legal
system,223 as are class action suits and jury trials.224 Korea should address
this problem through the enactment of new laws or changes in its judicial
system to award better compensation and injunctive relief for environmental
harm already caused and for foreseeable harm.
In order to increase the quality of life for all its citizens, Korea must
take bold steps towards strengthening its environmental regulatory system.
Any new environmental legislation or amendment to existing regulations
must be supported by better administration and implementation, and it must
improve the citizen participation process in Korea’s environmental affairs.
Citizens and environmental groups must be granted increased standing to
bring a claim for both government and private actions which degrade the
environment. Along with broadening standing requirements to citizens and
environmental groups that show a great interest in environmental protection,
Korea should also adopt stronger administrative regulations that would
efficiently enforce environmental regulations.
Making the changes
recommended in this section should lessen the potential for environmental
destruction and increase likelihood that Korea’s environmental regulatory
system will be effective against the development pressures of IFEZ and all
other existing and future Korean FEZs.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This comment has argued that as part of the IFEZ, Songdo City is
likely to experience tremendous rates of FDI-fueled economic growth, and
as a consequence, there will be many environmental challenges with the
development of the IFEZ. As examination of Songdo City demonstrates,
there are many environmental issues which must be addressed in
development of Korea’s FEZs. Further, Korea must keep in mind that
growth in the FEZs may greatly exceed projections, as was the case in
China’s SEZs.
Korea’s FEZs, unlike the Chinese SEZs, are supported by a better
environmental regulatory system, but Korean environmental regulations are
still inadequate. There are major problems with Korea’s environmental
regulatory regime, including lack of enforcement, narrow definition of
judicial review and standing, inadequate remedies, and gaps in some key
environmental regulations. Although environmentalism is growing in
Korea, a national policy towards economic development further exacerbates
Korea’s environmental problems. Considering that such an environmental
regulatory system is being tested against the world’s biggest real estate
development project at Songdo, tremendous environmental degradation is
likely to occur if the identified problems are left untreated.
Korea must re-assess its current environmental regulatory system and
make the necessary changes to its regulations, policies, implementation
methods, and the judiciary. Only when these improvements are made will
the environmental regulatory regime in Korea be effective against
environmental challenges brought on by the development of Songdo City,
IFEZ, and the remaining FEZs.

